ŠINKYŘÍKOVÁ, T., SOUKOPOVÁ, J.: Impact of standard rate of VAT on tax mix in EU 27. Acta univ. agric. et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2012, LX, No. 7, pp. 369-378 The Value Added Tax (VAT) is one of the key resources within tax collection and therefore VAT eff ectiveness and VAT complexity represent one of the current world topics. Standard rates of VAT may and may not be the simple key to defi ne whether VAT is important in the tax mix or not. This paper focuses on the question whether the amount of the VAT rate has an impact on the share of VAT in the tax mix. The VAT share on total taxes is studied in connection of average and median standard rates applied so as to answer the question: "Do the countries with higher share of VAT in the tax mix set its standard rates of VAT beyond the average of EU 27?" The paper examines this issue using data EU member countries, especially EU 27, in years 1995-2010.
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The Value Added Tax (VAT) is one of the most successful and prodigious phenomena in the contemporary fi scal structures. Developed as late as in 1950's, it has rapidly become the most widespread consumption tax in the world, currently being deeply entrenched in the tax systems of more than 140 countries (OECD, 2008) . Despite the strong harmonization of taxes within the European Union (EU), especially in a fi eld of indirect taxes, VAT rates are far from unifi cation. Each member state of the EU sets its own VAT rate (rate of VAT) according to Council Directives, especially 2006/112/EC. The standard rate may not be less than 15 % (Article 98). Thus, the member states are not limited by tax brackets, but only by the minimum rates.
It can come into being such diff erences between the (standard) rates applied, such as Hungary (27 % VAT) vs. Luxembourg or Cyprus (15 % VAT) 1 . Each member state can freely decide the rate of VAT applied while observing diff erent goals, e.g. budgetary -including the increase of tax income, the stimulation of the aggregate demand or the level of consumption, increasing or decreasing the relative accent on indirect taxation (in the overall tax burden) etc. Furthermore, to mitigate the regressive impact of indirect taxation, the reduced rates are applied. Does the VAT, in result, present the comparable share of tax revenues within member states?
Changing the rates of VAT so as to raise tax revenues expected, as the answer to the economic crisis and the lack of revenues or changes in rates of VAT could modify the tax mix (Owens and Battiau, 2011) . Several studies focused on the level of consumption, in a fi eld of temporary reducing the VAT rates (Barrell and Weale, 2009; Crossley et al., 2009) . Temporarily, the VAT cut has an impact on consumption, but with increasing rates a erwards the reaction of the demand will off set this impact in the long run. As Blundell (Blundell, 2009) concluded, the VAT has the potential to be a very successful (but) short-run stimulus. The changes of VAT rates infl uence also the diff erentiation in the rates across the Member states. As noted Široký and Kovářová (2011) the diff erences between the highest and the lowest rate applied tends to decrease.
Using VAT is also relatively eff ective way to collect revenues, and to raise collection of total taxes. Therefore countries have tendencies to "exploit" VAT collection by replacing others, less eff ective taxes (Keen and Lockwood, 2006) . Indirect taxes, including VAT, have over last years tendencies to gain more importance in total tax revenues in spite the fact that VAT actually collected represents about 50 % of theoretical VAT revenues, if there is no evasions and all fi nal consumption was submitted to standard rate (Taxation trends in the European Union, 2012).
Communiqué from Lucerne Conference (Consumption tax trends 2010: VAT/GST and excise rates, trends and administration issues, 2011, annex D) shows the will to maintain, modernize and simplify the VAT system of OECD members. The revenue share of VAT on total taxation in OECD countries has risen over 40 year period (18.6 % of total taxation in 2010 compared to 13.6 % in 1965) . Thus, the growing importance of VAT on total taxes does not concern solely the European Union and it is also true for recommendation to simplify VAT system. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1971) , shows that a simple rate system would not be the most effi cient way to tax consumption. Certain diff erences, mostly based on empirically estimated demand function could decrease the dead weight loss and thus, increase the eff ectiveness. The principal conclusion they have reached are classifi cation into commodity groups for taxation purposes and the optimal taxation is one that taxes more heavily goods which have a low income elasticity of demand. This, in principal, is assumed to created an optimal tax structure, (European Commission, 2007) but it requires the tax authority to be able to estimate regularly the price elasticity for all goods (new goods on the market can aff ect the price elasticity on already existing goods on the market etc.)
The common implication of the above-mentioned studies are several: the decision of applying the concrete rate of VAT is the result of diff erent policies; European harmonization constraint, budgetary goals, the impact on the consumption, the eff ectiveness and the equity issues, linked with the lower rates of VAT. The optimal tax system is practically unachievable, nevertheless, current VAT system needs, in certain way, to be more simple than it is now; the current system is far from uniform (European Commission, 2007 ) and thus, not compatible with applying the Origin principle. The Origin principle, one of the key goals embodied in the 1st directive; 67/227/EC 2 , would require the closest harmonization of tax base, so as to diff erent goods and services would be submitted to the same kind of VAT rate within member states. Furthermore, this would require the rates of VAT (standard, reduced, supper-reduced, zero and parking, if any) to be more coordinated.
The Green Paper on the Future VAT has been issued by European Commission so as to trigger and encourage the public debate on the future of VAT system. Several questions are formulated, mostly in connection with a need of further harmonization, i.e. to what extend the harmonization is needed so at to support the single market, based on taxation in country of origin (COM (2010) 695).
The results of broad public debate are presented by the Communication on the future of VAT (COM (2011) 851). The Origin principle is seen by Member States as politically unachievable as for the stakeholders this goal is not achievable in foreseeable future. "Thus the Commission has come to the conclusion that there are no longer any valid reasons for keeping this objective, and will purpose that it should be abandoned," (COM (2011) 851). Nevertheless, broadening the tax base, so as to improve the eff ectiveness of the VAT, remains one of the key priorities. The importance of standard rates would increase and the coordination on the ground of standard rates would predicate more about coordination of VAT system of Member States.
The aim of the paper is to answer the key question whether the amount of the rate of VAT has an impact on the share of VAT in the tax mix. The share of VAT revenues as a proportion of the tax mix will be studied in connection of standard VAT rates. Do the countries highly related on VAT (within tax collection) set its standard rates beyond the average? Are the standard rates the key factor to defi ne the tax collection (as a proportion of the tax mix)? Or, as a result of uncoordinated tax base, has the rate of VAT only little impact on a revenues side? Matthews (2003) studied VAT revenues in connection of standard VAT rates and posed the key question if, in current VAT system, Laff er curve actually exists. If there is a value of VAT rate from which the increase in rates would bring less positive impact on raised revenues caused by higher rates than the negative eff ect from broadening the tax base and tax evasions. The results actually proved the existence of VAT Laff er curve and, that the "optimal" rate for members of EU would vary around 18-19.3 %.
The simple rule "more important VAT is, (as VAT revenue on total taxes), the higher standard rate is applied" would not be true since the standard rate does not defi ne the tax revenues and if it does, the eff ect of Laff er curve appears.
Thus, the hypothesis that refl ects the possibility mentioned above the, is: The amount of standard rate of the VAT has clear implication on the share of VAT in the tax mix.
In the fi rst section, EU Member states will be divided into three groups, where the 1 st group will include the Members with highest and the 3 rd one with the lowest VAT share on total taxes. Than, these groups will be studies by the criteria of standard rates. The main question is, whether the group with higher share of VAT sets its standard rate also above the average and vice versa. This paper will demonstrate, that if the countries rely heavily on VAT (compared to all tax mix), it doesn't imply that the standard rates are set up above the EU average.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The dependence of the amount of rate of VAT on the share on VAT in the tax mix is studied from the other side. First is analyzed the share of VAT in the tax mix and is used cluster analysis. All members of EU were classifi ed onto three groups by nine members, according the average share of VAT on total taxes (in %), during the period from 1995 to 2010. This period elected, 16 years, is the longest possible to cover all members of EU 27. Earlier data aren't available for EU 27 members, since the VAT weren't introduced in several cases. Furthermore, in earlier period, introducing of VAT and modifi cation of tax system in new member countries could cause distortions and would lead to the misinterpretation. Thus, the 1 st group represents the countries with relatively highest share of VAT in the tax mix, the 2 nd group consists the countries with medium share of VAT in their tax mix and fi nally, the 3 rd group represents the countries with relatively low share of VAT in the tax mix. The classifi cation is based on average VAT share on total taxes for all covered period. Dividing into three groups was elected so as to simplify and precise the analysis.
For each group of countries, selected in a function of relative importance of VAT, the average and median of standard VAT rate is calculated. Than, the rates of VAT were compared within groups to answer the key question: Do the members of EU which rely relatively highly on VAT set its standard rates above the average?
As mentioned above, due to complexness of current VAT, the Standard rate is not the key factor defi ning the VAT collection. As a result, the group with the highest share of VAT on total taxes would not be the group with the highest standard VAT rate applied.
The hypothesis H is the following: The amount of standard rate of VAT has clear implication on the share of VAT in the tax mix. So as to approve the hypothesis, the average value of standard rate will be calculated for all the 3 groups of 9 countries.
Hypothesis will be rejected when the rate of VAT and the share of VAT on total taxation amount will be not directly proportional. Hypothesis will be approved, when the rate of VAT and the share of VAT on total taxation amount will be directly proportional.
The data about VAT share on total taxes was obtained from European Commission: Taxation trends in European Union (2012) . VAT revenues are presented in % of total taxation. The calculation is provided every year since 1995 to 2010.
Information about standard rates for all cover period and all member countries are based on data published by European Commission.
3 Standard rates are calculated by the frequency of 1 year, from 1995 to 2010. The time period elected was decided by criteria of the longest period, but covering the rates of VAT in (almost) all member countries.
In some Member countries 4 the changes in standard rates of VAT took place (several times) during one calendar year. Thus, only the rate that was applied for relatively longest period within a year was taken into account. There is an exception of year 2012, where the rate applicable in the fi rst month was taken into account. Concerning the 27 today members states, the VAT is calculate since this tax was introduced, regardless the membership to EU (typically the post-communist countries). Their VAT is calculated for the period when they weren't the EU member, which was true mainly from 1995 to 2003.
RESULTS
The calculation will cover the rates of VAT of all European countries, divided into three groups, where the criterion will be the share of VAT on total taxation and the average VAT ratio on total taxation is calculated for the period 1995-2010 and the members are ranked and then divided into following groups, where every group has 9 members: 1. 
A. VAT share on total taxation
VAT share on total taxation according to 3 defi ned groups of EU member states is specifi ed in Tabs. I, II and III.
The average share of VAT on total taxation for all the period covered is 24.6 %. The most elevated share of VAT is typical for Bulgaria (28.6 %) and Estonia (26.5 %). The least elevated share of VAT within this group is represented by Cyprus (21.9 %).
Importance of VAT, as visible from the average and the median, tends to grow; the average share is higher by 16.3 % in 2010 than in 1995. The median is not constantly up or below the average, it oscillates around. Furthermore, the median calculated for all covered period is the same as arithmetic average. This means the values are close to normal distribution and are not systematically asymmetric and inclined to le or right side.
Average VAT share for all covered period is 20.4 % which is by 17.1 % lower than the VAT share of 1 st group. The highest average is typical for Malta (21.9 %), Poland and Greece (21.8 %). The lowest share, au contrary, is represented by Czech Republic (18.5 %). The share of VAT, as in the previous case, has tendencies to grow; 18.9 % in 1995 compared to 21.9 % in 2010. (It is a rise about 15.9 %).
The median is rather higher than the average, with the exception in 1995 and 2002-5. For most of the period, the VAT share of countries involved rather exceeds the average share.
The average VAT share on total taxation is 16.7 %, which is by 31.8 % lower than within the 1 st group. Sweden (18.4 %) United Kingdom (18.3 %) and Netherlands (18.2 %) have the highest share within group. Italy (14.3 %) represents the opposite.
As in previous cases, VAT share on total taxation grows slightly; from 16. To summarize, all 3 groups have one thing in common -VAT become "more important" in the tax mix, the shi towards indirect taxation continues and this is the case of both types of countries, regardless the initial share of VAT (in 1995).
Prediction of the future of VAT (Taxation trends in European Union, 2011, pp. 36) is also a slight growth of indirect taxes, namely VAT. The reasons, that could be also considered as advantages of VAT are the following: Indirect taxes are less of a drag on economic growth, indirect taxes are friendlier towards capital accumulation, and indirect taxes do not have direct impact on foreign competitiveness.
As far as VAT share and its convergence, closer coordination (during the studied period) is not indicated. The values of 1 st and 2 nd groups are, nevertheless, below the values of 1995. The oscillation is, however, the prevailing trend -the VAT share on total taxation is not "harmonized" since 1995.
B. The rates of VAT in connection of VAT revenues
Every member state applies one standard rate of VAT. The average rate is 20.9 % in 2012 and this average value is comparable to 1 st group. Contrarily, 2 nd group has, on average, the most elevated rates applied; 22.1 %. This is given partially by Hungary, which applies 27 % rate in 2012. The variation of rates is 12 p.p., from 15 % to 27 %. The results presented in tables IV, V and VI does not include the data by 2011 and 2012, since the VAT share on total taxes is not available to compare with.
Standard rate of VAT represents, on average (EU 15 in 2000), 69 % of a taxable base. (Mathis, 2004) But their share vary greatly among member states; Denmark, with 100 %, eight other countries with values from average to 85 % and 6 countries below the average, and at last, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain with values below 50 %.
The variation of taxable base, subjected to standard rate also represents the variation of importance of the standard rate. Thus, the diff erences in tax base would predict, that the higher VAT share on total taxation does not imply higher standard rates. That would not support the hypothesis H. Table IV shows clear trend of closer coordination as far as standard VAT rates of the 1 st group. The standard rates tend to rise, as the VAT share on total taxation increases. Average rate in 2010 grows to 21 % and since 2002 median values exceeds the arithmetic average -this would be explained of Cypriot rate 15 %, which is by 3 pp. lesser than the second lowest value. BG  18  22  22  22  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20   EE  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  20  20   IE  21  21  21  21  21  21  20  21  21  21  21  21  21 The coordination of standard rates of VAT is also valuable for 3 rd group, although the diff erences in standard deviation in 1995 and 2010 aren't so important (0.4 pp). The average rate applied is the lowest between 3 groups, as it is the case of lowest VAT share on total taxation. In 2010, the variation of rates is the most important, compared to all other groups; with Luxembourg (15 %) and Sweden (25 %), rates vary by 10 pp.
The results in Tabs. IV, V and VI are clearly presented in graphs 1, 2 and 3, where the average, median and standard deviation are examined. The average and the median are presented so as to compare the results with VAT share and since the results obtained from the average would not necessarily be the same as the results obtained from median values, both values are presented. The standard deviation is presented since there is a slow coordination in rates of VAT. Although the prevailing trend is clear, the 3 followed groups diff er none the less. In all 3 cases, average standard rate tends to grow. The slowest trend (3.3 %) is represented by the 2 nd group, partially because of higher initial value. The 1 st group, with the lowest initial value grows by 12.8 %.
The average rate calculated for all three groups showed two main observations; one that all the groups of countries covered tends to raise its tax rates (by 0.7-2.3 pp), the second that the diff erentiation of mean values tend to shrink to 78.1 % in 2010 of diff erentiations between the average values in 1995.
Growing tendencies are less visible, especially in case of 2 nd group, where the median fell by 2 pp (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ). Comparing 1995 with 2010, there is no diff erentiation. The results obtained from 1 st and 3 rd group are more similar the previous; 3 rd group median raises by 8.6 % and 1 st group median raises by 16.7 % from 1995 to 2010.
Graph 3 shows a slight decrease of standard deviation over the period. That is, actually in accordance with Green Paper on the future VAT "in recent years, a certain convergence of the standard rates of VAT has been ongoing" (COM (2010) 695).
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If the results show the direct proportional relation of VAT share on total taxes and the amount of rate of VAT, the hypothesis H is rejected.
Average and median of standard rates (see graph 1 and 2), showed that the 2 nd group, with the medium VAT share on total taxes, and sets its rates above the rates of the 1 st group. In spite of the fact, that the 1 st group has, on average, the highest share of VAT on total taxes (see tables I, II and III). The main results obtained (giving the relevance of the hypothesis) are thus the same, regardless if the median or arithmetic average, are studied. As confi rmed by results obtained from average rates and the medium rates, it cannot be claimed that the higher the share of VAT on total taxes is, the higher the amount of standard rate of VAT becomes. The direct proportion is defi nitely not the case. The hypothesis is thus rejected, since the "clear implication" of rates of VAT on VAT share on total taxes is not approved.
DISCUSSION
While deciding the rates of VAT, each Member state has discretion in following diff erent goals: budgetary -including the increase of tax income, the stimulation of the aggregate demand of the level of consumption, increasing or decreasing the relative accent on indirect taxation (in overall tax burden), etc. Owens and Battiau (2011) showed that changing (increasing) of the rates of VAT so as to increase the tax collection in a period of economic crisis could modify the tax mix. These results are in accordance with data presented in Tabs. I-VI, 8 ex. PT 2002 , GR 2005 , MA 2004 , NL 2001 Comparing results obtained from graph 2 and 3 with Matthews (2003) , presumption about existence of VAT Laff er curve could not be rejected. The group with the highest VAT share on total taxation (1 st group) is one that, measuring by the median, has the more similar rates (until 2003) with "Matthews's optimum." Noteworthy that the 3 rd and lowest share group achieves similar rates meanwhile the average VAT share on total taxation in 1 st group reached up to 25 % and the 3 rd group 17 %. In the case of 1 st group, the results obtained by Matthews corresponds from the results presented here, but how to explain similar evidence of others groups? Concerning VAT share and the standard rate of VAT, there is no clear implication, since there are several other factors that may, in more precise way, impact the tax revenues, than the standard rates of VAT actually does. Rates of VAT and VAT share grows ensemble, but it does not mean, that one is the origin of other's growth.
The evidence of growing proportion of VAT on the tax mix is consistent with conclusion of Keen and Lockwood (2006) where VAT turned out to be a "money-machine" in "strong" sense -the revenues that VAT raises has to some degree been off set reduced revenues from other taxes. Thus, considering the tax mix, VAT share on total taxation increases, which is evidence that supports (but not directly prove) the "strong form".
As presented before, the standard rate of VAT is applied only to a certain proportion of VAT base.
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That would be one of the explanations, why the VAT on total taxation has not clear implication on the standard rate of VAT, as assumed by the hypothesis H, which is rejected. This paper focuses on the connection between the VAT collected and the rates applied to a relatively largest proportion of VAT base. But the VAT collected is represented "only" by a relative share on total taxation. The VAT share on GDP is not examined and thus, the tax quota, which diff ers 7 The higher share of VAT on total taxes, the higher diff erentiation in VAT rates at the beginning. (1 st group 3.0 pp, 2 nd group 3.2 pp and the 3 rd group 4.2 pp, see tables IV, V and VI) At the same time, the higher diff erentiation at the beginning, the deepest fall in standard deviation a erwards and the closer coordination in 2010. Comparing the values of standard deviation in 1995 and 2010, the 3 rd group falls by 13.3 %, 2 nd group falls by 28.1 % and the 1 st group falls by 47.6 %. 8 Portugal increased rate of VAT from 17 % up to 19 % in 2002; VAT share on the tax mix raised from 25.2 % to 26.0 %.
Greece raised its rate of VAT by 1pp in 2005, VAT share on the tax mix raised also by 1pp. Malta raises its rate of VAT from 15 % to 18 % in 2004 and the VAT share raised from 22.5 % up to 24.5 %. Netherlands raised its VAT rate by 1.5 pp in 2001 and its VAT share raised by 1.0 pp. Time leg was taken into account. 9 The Standard rate of VAT covers only, on average, 69 % of the VAT base. (Mathis, 2004) The importance of this rate would be one of the key factors defi ning VAT revenues. It may imply that other factors, such as importance of reduced rates, super-reduced rates and zero rates of VAT, ineff ectiveness in VAT collection such as tax evasions, stay important.
greatly within EU 27 (from 27.1 % in Lithuania up to 47.6 % in Denmark, 2010) could lead to misrepresenting. Thus, the examination of VAT rates in function of the share of VAT on GDP is the topic of next research, (even though it is possible, that the results obtained would bring the same conclusion) such as comparing these results with Matthews and Laff er curve.
CONCLUSION
This paper showed that countries with the highest share of VAT on the tax mix do not necessarily sets its standard rates beyond the average and thus, the standard rate of VAT is not the key factor to defi ne tax collection. There are several reasons; the standard VAT rate is not usually applicable to all VAT base and also, VAT is also subject to tax evasions or avoidances.
First, the EU Members were divided into groups in function of their VAT share on total tax. Second, VAT share was studied from 1995 to 2010 and the average, median and the standard deviation were calculated. VAT rates were than presented and both results were compared so as to answer the main question and indirectly, support the hypothesis H. The several limitations were discussed in precedent part and than, concluded.
The share of VAT on total taxes was already important in 90's. (almost 19.3 %, on average). Anyhow, this tax gains its importance (22.0 % in 2012). The identifi cation of key factor which enables collecting more resources is not simple for reasons mentioned above. The complexity and thus, the eff ectiveness of VAT system remains one of the key problems in a fi eld of indirect taxation.
Increasing standard rate of VAT could be succeeded by lowering the erosion of base of standard rate. As a result, the system of VAT could become more complex and would not automatically bring further revenues. In addition, the complexness of VAT could be one of motivation to tax avoidances of evasions.
Rising the rates of VAT aff ect the consumer prices. First, the prices elevated, if the price elasticity is important, could lead to drop in tax revenues. Second, if the rate of VAT is falling to original level would the prices follow this trend?
This paper focuses on connection of VAT share on total taxes and the standard rates of VAT. It demonstrated that one does not automatically lead to another. But the side eff ect on consumer prices and price distortions which was not studied is also very important and the deeper analysis on this ground should precede the changes of rates of VAT.
At last but not least, while answering the key question about the VAT share on total taxes in connection with standard rates of VAT, the proportion of VAT collection to all tax mix is aff ected by the level of tax quota which varies greatly. This could be also one of the reasons why the VAT share on the GDP could be studied although this could lead to similar conclusion.
The question remains whether VAT share on GDP would lead to identify more precisely the VAT rates, i.e. the countries with higher VAT ratio would be the same as the countries with the highest rates. Thus, this would be the subject of next research.
SUMMARY
The Value Added Tax (VAT) is one of the most successful and prodigious phenomena in the contemporary fi scal structures. Developed as late as in 1950's, it has rapidly become the most widespread consumption tax in the world. Despite the strong harmonization of taxes within the European Union, the rates of VAT are far from unifi cation. The paper was focusing on standard rates of VAT and the VAT share in the tax mix. Standard rates of VAT may and may not be the simple key to defi ne whether VAT is important in the tax mix or not. The aim of the paper is to answer the key question whether the amount of the rate of VAT has an impact on the share of VAT in the tax mix. Hypothesis H is following: The amount of standard rate of the VAT has clear implication on the share of VAT in the tax mix. Hypothesis is rejected when the rate of VAT and the share of VAT on total taxation are not directly proportional. Hypothesis is confi rmed when the rate of VAT and the share of VAT on total taxation are directly proportional. The method used in this paper is the method of induction. The dependence of the amount of rate of VAT on the share on VAT in the tax mix would be studied from the other side. All members of EU were classifi ed onto three groups by nine members, according the average share of VAT on total taxes (in %), during the period from 1995 to 2010. Thus, the 1 st group represents the countries with relatively highest share of VAT in the tax mix, the 2 nd group consists the countries with medium share of VAT in their tax mix and fi nally, the 3 rd group represents the countries with relatively low share of VAT in the tax mix. The average, median and standard deviation of standard rates of VAT were calculated. The rates of VAT were compared within groups to answer the key question, if the members of EU with relatively highest share of VAT on total taxation set its standard rate above the average. VAT share on total taxes was obtained from European Commission (2012) and the information about standard rates for all cover period and all member countries was obtained from European Commission /Taxation and Customs Union/VAT/VAT Rates (2012). As confi rmed by results obtained from average rates and the medium rates, it cannot be claimed that the higher the share of VAT on total taxes is, the higher the amount of standard rate of VAT becomes. The direct proportion is defi nitely not the case. The hypothesis is thus rejected.
